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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the potential impact of increased R&D efforts and structural change in 
Portugal on labour productivity. Based on existing literature on the relation between R&D 
expenditures, structural change and productivity, we evaluate the contribution of R&D and 
high-tech industries on productivity over the last 30 years. Our results confirm the importance 
of business R&D in the medium to high-tech sectors and of governement‟s R&D, as they 
stimulate productivity growth. However, we cannot hypothesize that productivity growth was 
primarily rooted on the development of medium-high technology industries.  
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Resumo 
 
Este artigo investiga o potencial impacto do aumento de I&D e de mudanças estruturais na 
produtividade do trabalho em Portugal. Com base na literatura sobre a relação entre despesas 
em I&D, mudança estrutural e produtividade, avaliamos a contribuição da I&D e das 
indústrias de alta tecnologia neste cenário durante os últimos 30 anos. Os resultados obtidos 
confirmam a importância dos investimentos em I&D das empresas de indústrias de alta e 
média-alta tecnologia e governamentais no crescimento da produtividade. Não obstante, não 
podemos afirmar que este fenômeno tenha como esteio principal o desenvolvimento destas 
indústrias. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic competitiveness of economies may be broadly analysed on the basis of a set of 
indicators, that is, production performance, productivity, innovation and international trade 
performance.  Recent data on these indicators had given rise to serious concerns over the 
comparative performance of Portugal (and even Europe
1
) over the last 15 years or so.  
The data for Portugal reveal that after the high-growth “new-economy” years of the 
second half of the last decade, growth has been considerably below the average of the 
European Union (EU hereafter)
2
. By 2005, Portuguese GDP per capita and real GDP per hour 
worked amounted to just 75 and 68 percent of the EU average respectively. Increasing 
productivity emerged as main economic challenge for Europe and Portugal in particular. 
Conscious of the gap, and in line with the European directives, in 2005 Portugal 
launched the Technological Plan with the goal of fostering growth and competitiveness. The 
overall goal has been embedded in a set of policy guidelines that include the following axes: 
1. Knowledge – To qualify the Portuguese for the knowledge society, fostering 
structural measures which aim at enhancing the average qualification level of the 
population, implementing a broad and diversified lifelong learning system and 
mobilizing the Portuguese for the Information Society; 
2. Technology – To overcome the scientific and technological gap, reinforcing public 
and private scientific and technological competences and recognizing the role 
played by enterprises in the process of creation of qualified jobs and Research & 
Development (R&D) related activities; 
3. Innovation – To boost Innovation, helping the productive chain to get adapted to 
the challenges of Globalization by means of the diffusion and development of new 
procedures, organizational systems, services and goods. 
 
                                                 
1
 Motivating the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 and its 2005 refocus on the objectives of jobs and growth. 
2
 In our article we considered the data up to 2005. Hence, we considered the 25 countries that were members of 
the European Union in that year (EU-25). We recall that up to 2003 the European Union was formed by 15 
countries (EU-15). The old Member States are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. On 1 May 2004 
ten new countries joined the EU. This ambitious step in the history of Europe was marked by the integration of 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungry, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The   
25-member EU now forms a political and economic area. Bulgaria and Romania signed their accession treaty on 
25 April 2005. They became members of the EU on 1 January 2007. Now the EU is formed by 27 member 
states.  
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Within the specific objectives and targets, it is notorious the attention diverted towards the 
need to increase the value added per employee and thus to reducing the gap with the EU. The 
increase of public and business R&D is also a priority and a specific objective of the plan. 
Medium and high-tech industries deserve otherwise particular enphasis in the Technological 
Plan. The data of the year base and of the Portuguese targets related with R&D and industrial 
structural change are reflected in the next table.  
 
Table 1. Selected targets of the Portuguese Technological Plan 
Indicators and measures 
Target 
for 
2010 
(%) 
Value (%) in 
2002/3* 
Portugal EU-25 
S&T 
Public spending in R&D as percentage of GDP 1 0.6 0.7 
Business spending in R&D as percentage of GDP 0.8 0.3 1.3 
Competitiveness 
 & 
 Innovation 
Employment in medium and high-tech industries as 
percentage of total employment 
4.7 3.1 6.6 
Value added of medium and high-tech industries 6.2 4.9 15.8 
Exports of high-tech as percentage of total exports 11.4 7.4 17.8 
Creation of firms in medium and high-tech sectors as 
percentage of total nº of enterprises creation 
12.5 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Technological Plan (2006).  
* Data for S&T refers to the year 2002. Data for competitiveness refers to 2003. 
 
These aims and targets of the plan are clearly understood within a context of generalized 
acceptance of the nexus between innovation, structural change and productivity. It is often 
argued that R&D and high-tech industries drive growth processes, and that they are the 
sources of growth in output, employment and productivity in the knowledge economy. 
Following Kaloudis and Smith (2005), a broad set of hypotheses are implied in these      
R&D-biased explanations of growth. We highlight the following:  
 Innovation accounts for a significant part of growth in modern economies; 
 There should be a significiant correlation between shares of high-tech in total 
output and levels/growth rates of productivity and GDP. 
Regarding the first hypotheses, the relation between R&D and productivity is strongly 
accepted in the literature. Even though, Griliches (1995) argues that the scientific and 
quantitative support for the relationship between the two aspects is rather limited. As for the 
impact of changes in industrial structure, it is widely recognized that the most technologically 
developed industries are more productive than the remainder (Aiginger, 2001). However, 
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empirical evidence on the contribution of structural change within manufacturing to 
productivity is rather scarce and far from consensual (Kaloudis and Smith, 2005).  
In what follows we explore the theoretical support for these hypotheses and test them 
in the Portuguese case. Because the high-tech industries, by definition, are all located within 
manufacturing, we focus in this paper primarily on the manufacturing sector. This study 
presents estimates of the contribution of R&D and structural change to productivity growth in 
the Portuguese Manufacturing Industry (PMI) over the period 1980-2003. It contributes to the 
existing literature in this field of analysis in two ways. First, the major sources of new 
technology are taken into account simultaneously: public R&D and business R&D in medium 
to high-tech sectors. Second, an attempt is made to evaluate the impact of the increasing 
weight of medium to high-tech industries in the manufacturing employment. The results are 
intended to provide insights into the following: 
 The contribution of public research to productivity growth; 
 The contribution of business R&D in high-tech sectors to productivity growth; 
 The importance of structural transformation towards innovation intensive sectors 
to productivity growth. 
The article is organised as follows. In the next section we provide the theoretical 
background to analyse the relation between R&D and productivity and then between 
structural change and productivity. In section 3 we point to the critical aspects of Portuguese 
competitiveness and present a brief characterization of the manufacturing industry over the 
period 1980-2003. We also present our empirical study. Finaly section 4 derives policy 
implications and further research avenues.   
 
2. Productivity, R&D and industrial structure 
 
In this section we discuss the relationships between productivity, R&D and industrial 
structure. These are used to define the hypotheses to be tested in the context of the Portuguese 
economy.  
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2.1. R&D and productivity 
 
“It is now well-known that both the governments of and private firms in 
most industrialised countries have devoted an increasing amount of 
resources to R&D. One of the main objectives of economic analysis is 
to evaluate whether the returns on this investment justify the initial 
expenditure. To this end, the relationship between R&D and 
productivity growth has been investigated at different levels of 
aggregation: economy, sector, industry and firm.” (Aiginger, 2001)  
 
The relationship between R&D and productivity of a country is commonly accepted in the 
literature. R&D resulting in new goods, new processes and new knowledge, is generally 
accepted as major source of technical change. As defined by the Frascati Manual (OECD, 
1993), R&D “comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase 
the stock of knowledge and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications”.  
The relationship between R&D and innovation is a complex and a non-linear one. In 
order to capture the links between R&D and productivity it is necessary to take several 
aspects into account. First, there are different types of R&D, and the effects of R&D on 
productivity may work through various channels. Second, R&D is not the only source of new 
technology: in modern and industrial economies, other activities such as learning by doing or 
design are conducted in most cases on the basis of new technology coming out of R&D (e.g. 
changes in the organisation of business related to the use of information and communication 
technology).  
However, it is also recognised that it is difficult to occur substantial advances in 
technology without work undertaken on a systematic basis and R&D is a good indicator of 
this broader phenomenon. 
There is major evidence that links R&D to productivity. In modern growth economies, 
it is clear that the inputs of capital and labour alone cannot account for a large part of output 
growth (Solow, 1957). In rich empirical tradition of work on productivity growth, the total 
factor productivity growth has been related to the accumulation of a “knowledge stock”, 
which is not accounted for in the measurement of the conventional stock of capital, but 
increases output via innovation and technological change. Economic theory (Solow, 1957; 
Romer, 1990) points to technical change as the major source of productivity growth in the 
long run. R&D expenditures have been suggested as a way of measuring this knowledge 
stock, giving rise to a range of works relating R&D expenditures and productivity.  
 7 
In 1979 Griliches discusses issues in assessing the contribution of R&D to 
productivity growth, and in 1980 he evaluated the returns of R&D expenditures in the private 
sector, using cross-section data from a set of companies over the period 1957-1963. The 
results reveal a positive correlation between the R&D expenditure and the productivity 
achieved by the companies, wich is given by a positive coefficient of the R&D of about 0.07. 
In a following work, Griliches (1995) discussed the econometric results and measurement 
issues in the relation between R&D and productivity. In his review, he refers the co-existance 
of three alternatives to analyse the relationship: case studies, econometric studies and the 
statistical analysis of patents. He concludes that the economic literature placed particular 
emphasis on econometric studies, mainly the Cobb-Douglas production functions and the 
CDM
3
 model.  
Guellec and Van Pottelsberge (2001) studied different types of R&D and analyzed 
their long-term effects on multifactor productivity growth. Using a sample of 16 OECD 
countries over the period 1980-98, they found that an increase of 1% in business R&D leads 
to a rise of productivity in 0.13%. The effect is larger in countries where the share of  
defence-related government funding is smaller. If on the other hand foreign R&D increases 
1%, then productivity will rise by 0.46%. Finaly, an increase of 1% in public R&D generates 
an increase of 0.17% in productivity growth. The effect is larger in countries where the share 
of universities (as opposed to government labs) is higher and in countries where the share of 
defence R&D is smaler. They also concluded that the effects of R&D are higher in countries 
whith higher business R&D intensity.  
Mairesse (2004) presents a model wich aims at quantifying the links between R&D, 
innovation and productivity on a panel of 4164 firms. According to his results, firms with a 
20% share of innovative sales would be 15% more productive than firms with just 5% in 
innovative sales. In the same line, the productivity of a firm that has filed two European 
patents would be nearly 10% higher than that of a firm having filed a single patent. 
As Mairesse, Wieser (2001) investigated the contribution of R&D to productivity 
performance at the micro level. Wieser‟s study presents a review of the literature wich 
demonstrates a significant impact of R&D on firm performance, but revals that the extent of 
the impact differs widely. On his own empirical work for a sample of 2167 large, publicly 
traded firms in Europe and the US, he also confirms the positive and significant contribution 
                                                 
3
 Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse. 
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of R&D to productivity growth, once that his results point to a private rate of return on R&D 
of about 12%. 
In these literature is also discussed the fact that the impact of R&D on the economy 
goes well beyond the direct private returns to the innovator or to the industry where it occurs. 
Indeed, early work on R&D concentrated only on the returns to firms and industries. 
However, more recently, spurred by comments in Griliches (1979; 1992), attention shifted 
towards spillovers effects. Since then a number of empirical studies demonstrate the existence 
of positive spillovers, being possible to identify a private return as well of a social return from 
the privately funded R&D investment. Fraumeni and Okubo (2005) as well as Sveikauskas 
(2007) reviews of the literature on R&D and productivity growth, shows that the overall rate 
of return to R&D is very large – about 25% for private return and 65% for social return. 
These two articles selected nine studies to determine the rate of return to privately funded 
R&D. 
 
Table 2. Studies on private and social return from R&D 
Author (Year) Private return (%) Social return (%) 
Sveikauskas (1981) 7-25 50 
Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) 10-27 11-111 
Bernstein and Nadiri (1991) 15-28 20-110 
Nadiri (1993) 20-30 50 
Mansfield (1977) 25 56 
Goto and Suzuki (1989) 26 80 
Terleckyj (1974) 29 48-78 
Scherer (1982, 1984) 29-43 64-147 
Source: Fraumeni and Okubo (2005). 
 
Most studies suggest that the private return of R&D represents only a third of the social return 
of R&D
4
. Therefore, Wieser (2001) says that the incentives for the private sector invest in 
R&D does not reflect properly the value that the society receives from that research
5
. This is 
one argument for the participation of the Government in the national R&D activities. Hence, 
the greater the divergence between the private and social returns of R&D, the stronger is the 
argument for the involvement of the Governement in these activities (Wieser, 2001). 
Government and university‟s research has a direct effect on scientific knowledge and 
public missions, as it generates basic knowledge (Adams, 1990; Brooks, 1994). In many cases 
                                                 
4
 In most of these studies “private” returns reflect industry returns, not the traditional returns to firms. 
Sveikauskas (2007) discusses how the different studies addressed this issue.  
5
 Considering the market failure, there is vast discussion on how to promote R&D. There are basically two 
alternatives. One is the direct intervention from the state through public R&D (addressed in this paper). The 
other is the strengthening of the property rights.  
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the effect of government‟s research on productivity is not measured, either because it is 
indirect or because its results are not integrated in existing measures of GDP (health-related 
research allows to improving length and quality of life, which are not taken into account in 
GDP measures). Basic research performed mainly by universities enhances the stock of 
knowledge of the society. New knowledge is not considered as an output in the current system 
of national accounts (contrary to physical investment and software for instance), and as such 
it is not included in GDP measures: hence the direct outcome of basic research is overlooked. 
However, basic research may open new opportunities to business research, which in turn 
affects productivity (Adams, 1990; Brooks, 1994; Guellec and Van Pottelsbergh, 2001). 
It is therefore not surprising that there have been very few studies of the effects of 
public research on productivity. Only some components of public research have been used in 
empirical frameworks. For instance, Adams (1990) finds that fundamental stocks of 
knowledge, proxied by accumulated academic scientific papers, significantly contributed to 
productivity growth in US manufacturing industries. Another example is provided by Poole 
and Bernard (1992) for military innovations in Canada, who present evidence that a    
defence-related stock of innovation has a negative and significant effect on the total factor 
productivity growth of four industries over the period 1961-85. 
As seen before, the idea that innovation stimulated by R&D expenditure makes an 
important contribution to productivity growth has been demonstrated by several authors. 
However, the relation between innovative activities, innovation itself and productivity is 
rather complex and far from consensual. In fact, other authors suggest the existence of a 
negative correlation between innovation and productivity in the short run (Young, 1991; 
Utterback, 1994; Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996; Christensen, 1997; Ahn, 1999; Bessen, 2002). 
What is a fact is that due to the rapid progress in the number and quality of studies 
focused on the relation between R&D and productivity, our knowledge of these issues has 
seriously improved in the last two decades. Nevertheless, it remains rather modest because of 
the substantial difficulties in measurement and in statistical inference of causal relationships 
from non-experimental data (Mairesse, 2004). 
 
2.2. Structural change and productivity 
 
The relationship between the economic structure of a country and its productivity growth has 
received more attention in recent decades. Salter (1960) was the first to emphasize the 
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importance that a structural change (modifications in the sectoral localization of labour, or 
possibly in the production factors in general) can have in boosting productivity.  
Since then, several authors have studied the relocation of inputs in the manufacturing 
industry, because although there is no doubt as to the productivity gains resultant from the 
shift of inputs from agriculture to manufacturing (Syrquin 1988), the consequences of 
movements that occur inside the manufacturing industry are not very clear (Rocha, 2005).  
While Salter (1960) presents significantly strong results about the benefits of structural 
changes in the UK economy between 1924 and 1950, more recent studies (Fagerberg, 2000; 
Timmer and Szirmai, 2000; Carree, 2002; Kiliçaslan and Taymaz, 2004; Singh, 2004) as we 
shall see below show more contained results. Some studies present a negligible or even a 
negative contribution of structural change to productivity growth (Singh, 2004; Kiliçaslan and 
Taymaz, 2004; Kaloudis and Smith, 2005). 
Fagerberg (2000) focused on the impact of specialization and structural changes on 
productivity growth in manufacturing, using a sample of 39 countries and 24 industries over 
the period 1973-1990.  The results reported in his study indicate that structural change still 
matters, but in a different way than before, because unlike what happened in the first half of 
the last century, the most technologically sophisticated industries decreased their shares in 
total employment between 1970 and 1990. In fact, the data suggest that in the sample studied 
by Salter, 1% higher productivity growth was associated with 1.4% higher growth in 
employment, while in Fagerberg‟s sample the relationship between productivity growth and 
employment is less than one half of that level. Even though, he argues that countries that have 
managed to increase their presence in the technologically most progressive industries like 
electronics (the so called electronics revolution), have experienced higher productivity growth 
in their manufacturing sector than other countries, due to important spill-over effects. 
Similar evidences to those of Fagerberg (2000) are presented by Timmer and Szirmai 
(2000), but in this case on 4 Asian countries
6
 and 13 subsectors of the manufacturing industry 
over the period 1963-1993. 
Adding to Fagerberg (2000), Carree (2002) seeks to complement the analysis by 
estimating the impact of the employment share of technologically progressive industries using 
a different methodology. Fagerberg claims that an increase of the “electronics” industry in 
total employment will generate higher productivity growth on the manufacturing sector. 
                                                 
6
 India, Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan. 
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However, the size of the impact, and as a consequence the extent of spill-overs, is found to be 
much smaller than estimated by Fagerberg. 
The relationship between structural changes and productivity growth in the 
manufacturing sector is also investigated by Singh (2004) in his study on South Korea over 
the period 1970-2000. The results shows that in the seventies occured a structural bonus 
(productivity gains due to the structural change). However, between 1980 and 2000 the 
relocation of inputs in the manufacturing sector has not ensured benefits to productivity. 
Kiliçaslan and Taymaz (2004) found similar results in their study on the relationship 
between industrial structure, productivity and competitiveness in manufacturing industry for a 
sample of MENA
7
 and Asian
8
 countries from 1965 to 1999. This study shows that the impact 
of the structural change in the productivity growth of the manufacturing sector is negligible 
for most countries, especially after the eighties. In this period, countries like Jordan and Korea 
present a negative correlation between the structural change and the productivity growth. 
Using simple correlation analysis, Kaloudis and Smith‟s (2005) study of 11 OECD 
economies for a 23-year period (1980-2002) with data from the OECD‟s STAN database, 
concluded that structural change (share of the electronics and other high-tech industries) 
within manufacturing was not the direct cause of the growth process in advanced OECD 
economies. They did not find evidence supporting the argument that the high-tech economies 
are also the high growth economies. They say that different economies can follow different 
paths of economic growth. Countries play different roles in the differentiated international 
economic system with clear patterns of division of labour among the highly developed 
economies.  
Kaloudis and Smith (2005) show that the higher the share of high-tech industries in 
manufacturing value added, the higher is GDP per inhabitant. Looking at income levels first, 
there is indeed a relationship between technological intensity and the level of income across 
national economies. However, they did not find any positive relationship when we compare 
the high-tech share in manufacturing value added with the rate of growth of GDP per 
inhabitant. Hence, they cannot conclude, therefore, that high-tech economies are also the high 
growth economies. Moreover, an additional important point is the absence of any convincing 
evidence for a hypothesis that low-tech economies are low growth economies. If anything, 
there is weak evidence in the data that low-tech economies are higher growth economies than 
                                                 
7
 Middle East and North Africa (MENA): Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malta, Marocco, Tunisia and Turkey. 
8
 Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, India and Pakistan.  
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the high-tech. This evidence suggests that growth does not rest on the high-tech driven 
structural change. 
Another fundamental question raised by Kaloudis and Smith (2005) is in which way 
the causality runs, since high-tech industries have in practice been created via significant 
government support, and have invariably been initiated by substantial publicly-supported 
R&D infrastructures (Mowery and Rosenberg (1989), as well as Bruland and Mowery (2004) 
provide good overviews of this discussion). There may therefore be a pattern of causality that 
runs from high levels of income, to government budgetary positions, to the creation of 
industries – that is, some R&D-intensive industries may be a consequence of high income, not 
a cause of it. 
 
3. Productivity, R&D and structural change: an analysis of the Portuguese 
manufacturing industry 
 
3.1. Overview of the Portuguese competitiveness   
 
We selected Portugal to test our hypotheses, because it is a good example of a country urging 
to catch-up the developed economies and by the fact that nowadays it has a clear policy and 
concern towards R&D and structural change. The Portuguese experience can also be valuable 
for other economies facing similar challenges.  
We shall now briefly summarise some of the significant aspects with respect to 
Portuguese competitiveness. We consider what recent data tells us about the EU in general 
and the Portuguese economy in particular. The data for Portugal reveal that after the         
high-growth “new-economy” years of the second half of the last decade, growth has been 
considerably below the average of the EU-25. By 2005, Portuguese GDP per capita amounted 
to just 75 percent of the EU-25 average, as we can see in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Real GDP growth, and Real GDP per capita (EU25=100) 
 Annual GDP Growth (%) GDPpc 2005  
(EU25=100)  1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Portugal 1.7 4.1 0.6 75 
EU-25 1.7 3.0 1.8 100 
USA 2.5 4.1 2.4 152 
Source: European Commission (2006a), Table 2.1. 
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Table 4 presents labour productivity growth rates in Portugal, the EU-25 and the US. The data 
clearly points towards a loss of competitiveness of the EU-25 as compared with the US from 
the mid-1990s onwards
9
. Portugal registered low labour productivity growth overall. By 2005, 
real GDP per person employed corresponded to 66 percent of EU-25 labour productivity. 
Increasing productivity emerged as main economic challenge for Europe and Portugal in 
particular.  
 
Table 4. Labour productivity per person employed (ppe) 
 
Annual Labour productivity growth (%) Real GDPppe 2005 
(EU25=100) 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Portugal 2.3 2.2 0.3 66 
EU-25 2.2 2.0 1.3 100 
USA 1.3 2.0 2.2 137 
Source: European Commission (2006a), Table 2.3.   
Note: Productivity is calculated considering persons employed (ppe) 
 
With regard to innovation indicators, the picture is not very favourable in spite of 
considerable advances. Data on R&D intensity (R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP) 
reveals that Portugal is well below the EU-25 average. Business expenditures in R&D in 
particular are relatively smaller than in other European counterparts, while public 
expenditures represent the largest share of total R&D in the country.  
 
Graph 1. R&D intensity in the EU-25, USA, Portugal and Japan - 2002 
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5
Portugal
EU-25
USA
Japan
%
Business Enterprise Sector Other Institutional Sectors
  
Source: Science and Technology – Statistics in Focus (2005), Eurostat. 
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 In the period of 2000-2005, and by historical standards, TFP growth in the EU was very low. The explanations 
put forward to explain EU TPF performance vary between those that highlight limited innovation, undeveloped 
services, issues of regulation and infrastructures (European Commission, 2006a). Also, the picture is quite 
differentiated across EU member states. For instance, Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries in general have TFP 
growth rates that are high by global standards and in some cases higher than those of US while, at the opposite 
end, most South European countries performed poorly.   
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The European Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2006c) ranks economies 
according to a summary innovation index (SII) that combines five different dimensions, 
grouped in inputs and outputs
10,11
. As far as Portugal is concerned, it is part of a group 
(Slovenia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, Greece and Bulgaria) of catching-up 
countries with SII scores well below the EU-25, albeit with a faster than average 
improvement in innovation performance. Public R&D contributed significantly to that end, 
albeit the data of private R&D intensity in manufacturing overall shows also considerable 
improvements since 1980. 
The developments in manufacturing have an important role on the overall performance 
of the economy. Recall that in Europe (EU-25), manufacturing accounts for about a third of 
employment and value-added (Eurostat, 2004). In Portugal the share of the manufacturing is 
similar. By 2003, the Portuguese manufacturing (section D)
12
 accounted for 28 percent of the 
value added and employment
13,14
. Hence, our empirical analysis focuses on the nexus R&D, 
structural change and productivity within the Portuguese manufacturing industry. 
 
3.2. Empirical analysis  
 
3.2.1. Data 
 
The data considered in this part of the study are mainly based on three basic concepts: R&D 
expenditures, employment and value added. The National Statistics Institute of Portugal 
(Instituto Nacional de Estatística) and the R&D Survey from the Science and Higher 
Education Observatory (Observatório da Ciência e do Ensino Superior) are our primary data 
sources to estimate the econometric model over the period 1980-2003. In this study, we had to 
overcome an obstacle caused by a change in methodology by the National Statistics Institute 
                                                 
10
 At the innovation inputs level: Innovation drivers (5 indicators, measuring the structural conditions of the 
innovation potential), knowledge creation (4 indicators, measuring the investments in R&D activities, considered 
key elements in a successful knowledge-based economy), innovation and entrepreneurship (6 indicators, 
measuring the efforts towards innovation at the firm level). Innovation outputs include two dimensions, namely 
applications (5 indicators, measuring the performance, expressed in terms of labour and business activities, and 
their value added in innovative sectors) and intellectual property (5 indicators, measuring the achieved results in 
terms of successful know-how). 
11
 A comparison with the US and Japan indicates that both are still ahead of the EU-25 in terms of innovation 
performance. 
12
 Manufacturing corresponds to section D “Secção D” and is formed by 14 subsections (industries), according to 
the Portuguese Classification of the Economic Activities “CAE – Rev. 2.1”. 
13
 Manufacturing employed about 1 153 914 employees in 1980 and 886 253 in 2003. 
14
 Authors‟ own calculations based on values of “Inquérito Permanente ao Emprego” (1981) from the National 
Statistics Institute of Portugal. 
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of Portugal in 1990 with regard to data collection of employment and value added. Recall that 
until 1989 the data published by the National Statistics Institute of Portugal was obtained 
through a survey of a sample of firms. Since 1990, the data from INE considers all firms. In 
order to have a consistent series, we calculated for the years 1980-1989 the values that would 
correspond to all firms. We started by calculating what would be the 1989 value under the 
new methodology (Y*), which assumed that the annual growth rate for 1989-1990 was the 
same of the annual compound growth rate
15
 over the period 1990-2003, 20031990 : 
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We assumed α as the annual growth rate for 1989-1990. It follows that 
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For the remaining years (1980-1988), we had the annual growth rates (βi) provided by the 
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Having the values for 1988, we applied the effective annual growth rates and calculated the 
Y
*
i for the remaining years by backward induction.  
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3.2.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Looking in detail at the labour productivity in the PMI over a long time period, we verify that 
productivity in manufacting has increased considerably, as result of both, a decline in 
employment and an increase in value added.  
 
Graph 2. Labour productivity of the Portuguese mananufacturing industry (1980-2003) 
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Source: Authors‟ own calculations based on values of “Estatísticas Industriais” (1980-1989) and “Estatísticas das 
Empresas” (1990-2003) from the National Statistics Institute of Portugal. 
Note: Value added of PMI at constant prices (consumer price index – base year 1986). 
 
The period under analysis can be divided in two cicles. The first cicle runs from 1980-1985, 
and the second from 1985-2003. The first period is characterized by moderate productivity 
growth. Aguiar and Martins (2004) explain the developments based on the international crisis 
on the aftermath of the Oil Shocks of 1973 and 1979, internal policies and the austerity 
implied by the stability plans negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
16
. From 
1985 onwards, industrial productivity accelerated, albeit in a context of 
“desindustrialization”17. Aguiar and Martins (2004) proposed four main reasons for this 
evolution, namely the macroeconomic results of the stabilization plans, institutional and 
political stability fostering private initiative, accession to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1986, and favourable international conditions (depreciation of the USD, decline in 
interest rates and in the Oil Prices).  
Although labour productivity in the PMI and in the Portuguese economy in general 
has registered a positive evolution in the last decades, it continues to remain significantly 
                                                 
16
 Stabilization Plan of 1978-1979, and the Second Stablization Plan of 1983-1984. 
17
 A decline in the weigh of the industry in the overall economy.  
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below the European average. The above discussion highlights that Portugal has to generate 
faster productivity growth.  
 
Graph 3. Private R&D intensity in Portuguese manufacturing industry 
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Source: Own elaboration based on “Estatísticas Industriais” (1980-1989), “Estatísticas das Empresas”        
(1990-2003), “Anuário Estatístico” (1986-1989) and “Anuário Estatístico de Portugal” (1990-2003) from the 
National Statistics Institute of Portugal, as well as data from the R&D Survey by the “Observatório da Ciência e 
do Ensino Superior”. 
 
The data also suggest that with a view to competitiveness it is not enough to look at capital 
per worker, but that innovation and an adequate business environment (factors considered by 
TFP) are fundamental with a view to competitiveness and growth, an issue focused by the 
Lisbon Agenda. Looking at the data on innovative activities in Graph 3, it is clear the positive 
trend from 1988 onwards, in spite of the slight decline in early 1990s and 2000s mainly 
associated with the international crisis (Biscaya et al., 2002). Neverthless, business R&D is 
still realively lower than in the EU. The small size of the firms has been advanced as one of 
the possible explanations for the low levels of R&D in Portuguese industry. 
Another set of reasons are related to the industrial structure, namely the strong 
concentration in low-tech sectors (Gonçalves et al., 1999). Indeed, the importance of medium 
and high-tech sectors on the innovation performance of country is clear when we look the 
distribution of the investments in R&D. For the case of the PMI, Table 5 shows a 
concentration in the high-technology and medium-high-technology industries. Machinery 
equipment, electric and optical equipment as well as the transport equipment industries 
represented in 2003 about 45% of the total expenditure in R&D carried out by the PMI. Coke 
and petroleum, chemicals and products must also be mentioned on account of their 25%. 
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Table 5. Structure of expenditure in R&D (current prices), 2003 
Branch of Economic Activity 
R&D 
(thousand €) 
R&D (%) 
D      Manufacturing 150 957.9 100 
DA   Food, beverages and tobacco 5 651.0 4 
DB   Textiles 10 509.9 7 
DC    Fur and leather 733.3 - 
DD   Wood, cork and products 3 718.0 2 
DE    Pulp, paper, paper products, publishing and printing 2 987.7 2 
DF    Coke and petroleum 37 249.0 25 
DG  Chemicals 11 032.1 7 
DH Rubber and plastics 6 830.0 5 
DI   Non-metallic mineral roducts 2 833.5 2 
DJ   Basic metals and metallic products 15 874.7 11 
DK  Machinery equipment, n.e. c. 44 518.3 29 
DL  Electric and optical equipment 7 346.8 5 
DM  Transport equipment 1 673.6 1 
Source: Adapted from the R&D Survey (2003) by the “Observatório da Ciência e do Ensino Superior”. 
Note: Due to statistical secrecy reasons, the results of subsections DF and DG are presented as a whole.  
 
Regarding industrial structure, Portugal is often characterised as specialising in labour 
intensive industries. An analysis of the employment structure within manufacturing reinforces 
this idea. In 2003, textiles still accounted for 26 percent of employment in Portuguese 
manufacturing. Food, beverages and tobacco followed by basic metals and metallic products 
account for 12 and 10 percent of the manufacturing employment. Machinery equipment, 
electric and optical equipment and transport equipment altogether account for only 15 percent 
of the manufacturing employment in 2003.  
 
Table 6. Structure of employment, 2003 
Industry Nº employees 
Employees 
(% on total) 
D      Manufacturing 886 253 
 
100 
DA   Food, beverages and tobacco 106 277 12 
DB   Textiles 222 602 26 
DC    Fur and leather 62 333 7 
DD   Wood, cork and products 48 611 5 
DE    Pulp, paper, paper products, publishing and printing 53 428 6 
DF    Coke and petroleum 2 136 - 
DG  Chemicals 21 715 2 
DH Rubber and plastics 24 511 3 
DI   Non-metallic mineral roducts 64 771 7 
DJ   Basic metals and metallic products 91 519 10 
DK  Machinery equipment, n.e. c. 43 124 5 
DL  Electric and optical equipment 49 027 6 
DM  Transport equipment 34 168 4 
DN  Other manufacturing industries 62 031 7 
Source: Own elaboration based on “Estatísticas das Empresas” (2003), from the National Statistics Institute of 
Portugal. 
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The analysis of the PMI in terms of value-added reveals once more the weight of textiles, 
food, beverages and tobacco, with 14 and 13 percent of the PMI value-added in 2003. 
Machinery equipment, electric and optical equipment and transport equipment, account 
altogether for 19 percent of the value added in 2003.  
Regarding specialisation in perspective with Europe, three groups of countries can be 
identified within the EU-15
18
. The first one includes countries specialised in high labour skill 
sectors (Belgium, France, and Luxembourg) and high to intermediate labour skills (Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom). The second group includes 
countries specialised in the two lowest categories of labour skills and includes Portugal (apart 
from Austria, Spain, Greece and Italy). Note that in the study by DG Enterprise of the 
European Commission (2006b), Portugal is characterised as specialising
19
 in leather and 
footwear, clothing, textiles, wood and products of wood, financial intermediation, radio and 
television receivers. Finally, there is a group of countries without a clear specialisation profile 
(Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland). This implies that the distribution of value added is 
very similar to the one of the EU-15 as a whole. 
 
Table 7. Structure of value-added (current prices), 2003 
Industry VA (thousand €) VA (%) 
D      Manufacturing 18 470 272 
 
 
100 
DA   Food, beverages and tobacco 2 604 169 13 
DB   Textiles 2 638 017 14 
DC    Fur and leather 668 708 4 
DD   Wood, cork and products 806 520 4 
DE    Pulp, paper, paper products, publishing and printing 1 803 996 10 
DF    Coke and petroleum 523 801 3 
DG  Chemicals 1 049 753 6 
DH Rubber and plastics 719 447 4 
DI   Non-metallic mineral roducts 1 711 180 9 
DJ   Basic metals and metallic products 1 719 353 9 
DK  Machinery equipment, n.e. c. 1 026 060 6 
DL  Electric and optical equipment 1 346 985 7 
DM  Transport equipment 1 018 573 6 
DN  Other manufacturing industries 833 709 5 
Source: Own elaboration based on “Estatísticas das Empresas” (2003), from the National Statistics Institute of 
Portugal 
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 The value was calculated for the 15 countries that were members of the European Union up to 2004 for which 
data was available.  
19
 The indicator of sectoral specialization of EU-15 member states here presented compares a country‟s       
value-added shares across industries with the average EU-15 industry‟s shares. The indicator is defined, for 
country „i‟ and industry „j‟, with VA being value added and EU corresponding to the EU-15, as to indicate 
specialization equal to the EU average if the value is 1 for a given industry. The higher the value of the indicator, 
the higher the country‟s specialization compared with the EU average.  
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Following the OECD High-tech classification of manufacturing industries
20
, we may analyse 
the PMI‟s employment structure at this level. In this regard, great stability is verified over the 
years, where the low-technology and medium-low-technology industries are visibly dominant. 
These industries as a whole represent in 2006 about 84% of the total employment in the 
Portuguese manufacturing, while in the set of 4 countries considered in the table 8 they don‟t 
represent more than 58%.  
 
Table 8. Employment structure in terms of industries by technological intensity (%) 
Global Technological Intensity 
Portugal  Germany+UK+Italy+France* 
1985 1994 2003 2006 1985 1994 2006 
High-tech industries 3 3 3 2 9 9 7 
Medium-high-tech industries 12 13 13 14 32 33 35 
Medium-low-tech industries 26 25 21 
84 
25 24 
58 
Low-tech industries 59 59 63 34 34 
Total manufacturing 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Adapted from Godinho and Mamede (2004) except 2003 (authors‟ own calculations based on values of 
“Estatísticas das Empresas” (2003) from the National Statistics Institute of Portugal) and 2006 (own calculations 
based on values of “Science, technology and innovation in Europe” (2008) from Eurostat). 
* For comparision we report the average from Germany, United Kingdom, Italy and France 
 
As seen, the structure of the PMI shows clearly the weight of low and medium to low 
technology sectors (Godinho e Mamede, 2004). Neverthless, the relationship between 
structure and productivity must not disregard the starting level. An increase in the weight of 
high and medium to high technology industries of about 1 percent may have significant 
impact on economies with a very low starting point (Kaloudis and Smith, 2005). Otherwise, 
even if an industry‟s employment share remains constant over time, there may have been a lot 
of entry and exit of firms and innovation (products and processes) in that industry. As we 
mentioned before, high and medium to high technology industries are the most highly 
innovative within Portuguese manufacturing. These aspects need be considered. 
Hence, the emergence of competitors with a broad spectrum of comparative 
advantages in industrial activities has put the issue of the manufacturing industry‟s future in 
industrialised countries on the agenda. The discussion of whether Europe can hold on to 
manufacturing assumes particular relevance for economies such as the Portuguese one, 
strongly open and relatively specialised in labour-intensive sectors. 
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 In appendice 1 we provide the OECD High-tech classification of manufacturing industries. 
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3.2.3. The model and variables 
 
Previously we highlighted the increase in PMI‟s productivity as well as the developments 
regarding innovation and structural change. Following the literature reviewed in section 2, 
three hypotheses are tested on the Portuguese manufacturing over the period 1980-2003: 
H1) Public R&D activity has a positive impact on manufacturing productivity; 
H2) Business R&D in the high-technology and medium-high-technology industries 
has a positive impact on manufacturing productivity; 
H3) An increase of the high-technology and medium-high-technology industries on 
the manufacturing employment has a positive impact on the manufacturing 
productivity. 
If an exact innovation model in all its multiple dimensions was available, we would be 
able to fully understand the complex nature of innovation (Mairesse, 2004). However, such a 
model does not exist. Nevertheless, in Mairesse (2004) words, “it is worth trying to account 
for innovation differences, even in a crude and simplified manner.” 
Once surpassed the problem of the time-coherence of the series, we obtain 24 usable 
observations. With a small sample size such as ours, the empirical analysis should be kept to a 
minimum level of complication, since good small-sample properties of estimation methods 
are generally difficult to obtain.  
Since productivity is, among other things, a result of innovation, and innovation is, 
among other things, a result of R&D (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2002), we present a multiple 
regression model that allows us to quantify the relation between a dependent variable (Y) and 
a set of independent variables (X0, X1, X2,..., Xn) through the estimation of their parameters 
(β0, β1, β2…, βn): 
 
ttnnttt uXXXY   ...22110   , with X0 = 1  ;  t = 1,2...,T    
 
or                       (1) 



n
i
ttiit uXY
1
0      , with X0 = 1  ;  i = 1,2...,n  ;  t = 1,2,...T. 
 
Based on equation (1), we developed an econometric model in order to explain the PMI‟s 
labour productivity. 
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The econometric model includes public R&D activity by the Portuguese State (H1) 
and business R&D in medium and high-tech industries so as to analyze the relation between 
R&D and the PMI‟s labour productivity, giving particular enphasis to R&D in medium and 
high intensive sectors (H2).  
To test Hypotheses 3 we included as a variable the weight of medium to high-tech 
industries on total manufacturing employment, as this group of industries registered a slight 
increase over the period under analysis. In our study we considered the machinery equipment 
(ME), electric and optical equipment (EOE) and transport equipment (TE) sectors, which are 
classified by OECD as medium to high-tech intensive sectors.  
 
ttttt uXXXY  3322110                                                                                     (1.1) 
with X0 = 1  ;  t = 1, 2, ...24 
 
where: 
 Y: stands for PMI labour productivity, which is represented by the logarithm of the 
ratio between the value added of PMI (constant prices: base year 1986) and 
employment in the PMI; 
 X1 : stands for public R&D intensity which is represented by the logarithm of the ratio 
between the Portuguese State‟s expenditure in R&D and the value added of PMI;  
 X2 : stands for the private intensity in R&D of ME, EOE and TE, which is represented 
by the logarithm of the ratio between private expenditure in R&D by these three 
industries and the value added relative to ME, EOE and TE;  
 X3 : stands for the proportion that ME, EOE and TE as a whole have in the total 
employment of the PMI, which is represented by the logarithm of the ratio between 
employment in these three industries and total employment in the PMI. 
 
We further introduced a number of lags for R&D related variables (X1 and X2). The 
introduction of lags is based on the fact that R&D expenditures may well take time to affect 
output. Indeed, investments in R&D do not normally produce immediate results because time 
is necessary before new knowledge can be developed, so that it can be disseminated and 
commercialized in the economy (Griliches, 1979).  
Seeing that a significant number of studies have demonstrated that this lag varies on 
average between one and four years (Mansfield et al., 1971; Pakes and Schankerman, 1984; 
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Acs and Audretsch, 1988), we also estimate our model considering a temporal lag  of one, 
two, three and four years for the variables related to R&D intensity (X1  and X2).  
 
3.2.4. Estimation results 
 
Tables 9 and 10 present the values obtained from the estimation of the model through the 
method of ordinary least squares (OLS). In the original model without any temporal lag for 
the independent variables (column i) we observed a positive autocorrelation 
21
 (ρ > 0) with the 
Durbin-Watson‟s value (d = 0.4728) falling in the interval ] 0; d L [
22
. In order to correct 
eventual autocorrelation problems, the results presented in the tables were estimated using 
Newey-West estimators (model a), and 1-year lag for the dependent variable (model b), 
respectively. As shown in Table 9, the autocorrelation persisted with the model a
23
. The 
results of Table 10 demonstrate that the inclusion of a 1-year lag for PMI labour productivity 
eliminates the positive autocorrelation in the residuals.  
We also estimated the models considering a temporal lag of one, two, three and four 
years for the variables related to R&D intensity (X1 and X2). 
Our results show that only Hypothesis 2 is partially supported, as the coefficient of the 
independent variable X2 is the only one statistically significant in both models. Therefore, 
only X2, the variable measuring the private intensity in R&D of ME, EOE and TE, contributes 
to the explanation of the PMI labour productivity growth. However, in model b the effect of 
X2 becomes significant after the 3-year lag, suggesting that the effect of private intensity of 
R&D is not immediate. 
Hypothesis 1 and 3 on the other hand are not confirmed, once that the coefficients of 
variables X1 and X3 are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the coefficients of variable 
X1 are mainly positive, and in model b the signal of X3 becomes positive with a 4-year lag. 
When included in model b, the variable Y-1 is always statistically significant at 1% 
level, wich means that last values of productivity in manufacturing industry exert a positive 
effect on the productivity values in the next years. 
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 In this situation, an increase in the labour productivity in the period t generates a positive impact on the residue 
of the following period (period t +1).  
22
 The value of dL with a 5% significance level is given by 1.101.  
23
 Given the small sample size, remedies like robust Newey-West standard errors and covariances should be used 
carefully, since their consistency properties under autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are only crudely 
approximated in small samples (McCulloch, 2008).   
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The independent variables as a whole reflect a good explanatory capacity for the 
PMI‟s labour productivity, once that FObserved is higher than FCritical at the 1% significance 
level. The high R
2
 reflects a good adjustment of the models. A substantial part of the total 
variation in the PMI‟s labour productivity is explained by the independent variables 
considered in the models.  
 
(model a) 
 
Table 9. Estimation results (NEWEY-WEST estimation) 
 
Variable Parameter (i) (ii)1-y lag (iii)2-y lag (iv)3-y lag (v)4-y lag 
 
X0 
 
0 
4.1631** 
(1.8950) 
3.3048* 
(1.8512) 
2.9816* 
(1.5171) 
2.9294** 
(1.2322) 
2.9002** 
(1.0178) 
 
X1 
 
1 
1.0284 
(0.7690) 
1.0856 
(0.9687) 
0.8581 
(0.6258) 
0.7017 
(0.4212) 
0.6484* 
(0.3152) 
 
X2 
 
2 
0.7045** 
(0.3279) 
0.5939 
(0.3617) 
0.6155** 
(0.2159) 
0.6347*** 
(0.1725) 
0.5727*** 
(0.1518) 
 
X3 
 
3 
-0.7852 
(1.9586) 
-1.1523 
(2.3742) 
-0.8530 
(1.6871) 
-0.5919 
(1.2869) 
-0.3875 
(1.1004) 
Observations 
 
          24          23          22          21          20 
R
2
  
 
   0.8522    0.8433   0.8463   0.8747    0.8938 
Durbin-Watson 
 
   0.4728   0.4720   0.3938   0.3986    0.5965 
FCritical*** 
 
       4.43       4.50       4.58       4.67       4.77 
FObserved 
 
 38.4364 34.0772 33.0493 39.5729 44.8660 
Notes: Standard Errors in brackets. In column (i), the model is estimated without any lag, in column (ii) with a  
1-year lag for variables X1 and X2, in column (iii) with a 2-year lag, in column (iv) with a 3-year lag and in 
column (v) with a 4-year.  
*Significance at 10%; **Significance at 5%; ***Significance at 1%. 
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(model b) 
 
Table 10. Estimation Results with a 1-year lag or the dependent variable 
 
Variable Parameter    (i) (ii)1-y lag (iii)2-y lag (iv)3-y lag (v)4-y lag 
 
X0 
 
0 
-0.5819** 
(0.3179) 
-0.3583 
(0.3003) 
-0.0732 
(0.2725) 
0.1653 
(0.2240) 
0.2378 
(0.2818) 
Y-1 1 
0.9674*** 
(0.0399) 
0.9177*** 
(0.0397) 
0.8501*** 
(0.0389) 
0.7866*** 
(0.0349) 
0.7714*** 
(0.0478) 
 
X1 
 
2 
-0.0265 
(0.1240) 
0.1206 
(0.1229) 
0.1143 
(0.0934) 
0.0569 
(0.0636) 
0.0480 
(0.0746) 
 
X2 
 
3 
-0.0546 
(0.0591) 
-0.0448 
(0.0560) 
0.0304 
(0.0457) 
0.0944** 
(0.0343) 
0.0803* 
(0.0414) 
 
X3 
 
4 
-0.1150 
(0.2408) 
-0.3230 
(0.2435) 
-0.2542 
(0.1875) 
-0.0709 
(0.1340) 
0.0285 
(0.1597) 
Observations 
 
         23         23        22           21        20 
R
2
  
 
   0.9951   0.9949  0.9947     0.9962   0.9942 
Durbin-Watson    1.5948   1.5194  1.6672     2.3995   2.3861 
FCritical*** 
 
       4.50       4.50      4.58         4.67       4.77 
FObserved 
 
 904.916 875.111 800.730 1044.261 643.752 
Notes: Standard Errors in brackets. In column (i), the model is estimated without any lag, in column (ii) with a  
1-year lag for variables X1 and X2, in column (iii) with a 2-year lag, in column (iv) with a 3-year lag and in 
column (v) with a 4-year.  
*Significance at 10%; **Significance at 5%; ***Significance at 1%. 
 
4. Discussion and implications 
 
Our model makes many simplifying assumptions, but its main virtue is that it takes into 
consideration the indirect impact of public R&D as well as of medium and high-tech 
industries R&D in other sectors where the R&D effort is made. Our results confirm the 
importance of business R&D in the medium to high-tech sectors, as they stimulate 
productivity growth. We further reveal that the direct impact and the inherent spillovers from 
the private expenditure in R&D occur in a relatively shorter period of time than that of public 
investment. R&D is overwhelming important, but, R&D expenditures may be only one part of 
the story behind the Portuguese backlog. Factors such as absorptive capacity, interactions 
within the S&T system, regulation and stability may be just as important in achieving the TP 
ambition.  
Regarding the role of structural change, the results deserve an in-depth analysis and 
the conclusions are not straightforward.  
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In the countries examined by Kaloudis and Smith (2005), there has been a clear 
tendency for the share of low-tech industries in manufacturing to decline during the period        
1980-1999, while the share of high-tech industries has increased. This applies to both 
production and employment. However, they concluded that among the OECD countries 
studied, structural change within manufacturing is not the direct cause of the growth process 
in advanced OECD economies. In our case we did not identified a decline (or growth) in the 
weight of technology intensive industries. Probably for that reason we could not confirm 
Hypothesis 3. Othewise, the fact that high-tech sectors are growing faster than medium or 
low-tech sectors in manufacturing output, does not necessarily mean that high-tech 
contributes more to overall manufacturing growth or productivity growth. High-tech sectors 
are small, so even high growth rates can have a relatively diminutive overall impact.  
 Based on our findings for Hipothese 3, we cannot hypothesize that productivity 
growth was primarily rooted on the creation of new sectors. Overwhelming important has 
been probably the internal transformation of sectors which already existed and/or are 
growing. Hence, one must avoid the views that emphasize excessively the role of high-tech 
sectors in economic growth, which often underestimate processes of change and needs in 
those sectors of the economy with low R&D investments. Finally, there has been structural 
change at the level of the economy as a whole, with a sustained risen in the share of services, 
and this rise does not support the high-tech argument, since sevices in general tend to be 
considered less R&D intensive than high-tech manufacturing. Moreover, a developed service 
sector may well contribute significantly to manufacturing productivity, and this fact was not 
taken into account in our analysis.  
But, as refered previously, even if an industry‟s employment share remains constant 
over time, there may have been a lot of entry and exit of firms and innovation (products and 
processes) in that industry. We verified that the innovation developments in the industries 
under consideration had positive impact on the productivity evolution in the time period 
analysed. The dynamisation of business R&D in the Portuguese manufacturing relies 
substantially on the dynamics of medium to high-tech industries, even if they do not gain 
considerable weight in the total employment or value-added.  
Finally, from the analysis it is possible to derive future research avenues. As 
demonstrated by several studies, there has been a clear tendency for the share of low-tech 
industries in manufacturing to decline, while the share of high-tech industries has increased. It 
is nevertheless important to confront the claims of high-tech approaches with the evidence. 
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Appendice 1 
 
 
High-tech classification of manufacturing industries 
Global 
Technological 
Intensity 
Economic Activity 
Average R&D Intensity 
(%) 
High-technology  
 Aeronautics and aerospacial 
 Pharmaceutic products 
 Office equipment and computing 
 Radio, TV and communication equipment 
 Medical instruments and optical 
7.7 – 13.3 
Medium-high  
technology  
 Machinery and electric equipment 
 Motorvehicles 
 Chemicals, except pharmaceutical industry 
 Rail and transport equipment n.e. 
 Other machinery and equipment 
2.1 – 3.9 
Medium-low 
technology  
 Construction and naval repair 
 Coke, Petrol and nucler  
 Non-metallic mineral products  
 Basic metals and metallic products 
 Metallic products (except machinery and equipment) 
0.6 – 1 
Low-technology 
 Recycling 
 Pulp, paper, paper products, publishing and printing  
 Food, beverages and tobacco 
 Textiles 
 Fur and leather 
 Wood and cork products 
0.3 – 0.5 
Source: OECD based on NACE rev. 1.1. 
 
